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Dodd-Frank as Maginot Line
Steven A. Ramirez*
INTRODUCTION
On May 10, 1940 the German Army opened a massive
offensive aimed at France.1 Five weeks later, on June 14, 1940,
the Germans occupied Paris and essentially knocked the French
out of World War II.2 The French defense strategy relied upon a
system of fixed fortifications on the French frontier known as the
Maginot Line, which ran from Switzerland to Luxembourg.3 The
Germans countered the Maginot Line with a new form of
mechanized warfare that allowed them to fly over and drive
around the fixed fortifications with airplanes and armored
vehicles, through the unfortified Ardennes Forest.4 The enginedriven warfare of World War II displaced the trench warfare of
World War I and rendered the Maginot Line strategically
irrelevant. Indeed, the Maginot Line drew massive resources
from the French military elsewhere, engendered an illusory
sense of security, and enabled the Germans to craft a strategy in
full view of the primary French defense deployments.5 While the
Maginot Line would have helped the French effort to win a war
like World War I (a catastrophe for all concerned), it did little to
prevent France’s more catastrophic defeat in World War II, and
even hastened the French defeat.6
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act or Dodd-Frank)7 may prove as
ineffective as the Maginot Line. It will likely foreclose a
* Professor and Director, Business and Corporate Governance Law Center; Loyola
University Chicago; Sramir3@luc.edu.
1 Gary Sheffield, The Fall of France, BBC (Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
history/worldwars/wwtwo/fall_france_01.shtml.
2 Id.
3 Id.; JULIAN JACKSON, THE FALL OF FRANCE: THE NAZI INVASION OF 1940, at 26
(2003).
4 JACKSON, supra note 3, at 39.
5 Id. at 26–27.
6 J. E. KAUFMANN & H. W. KAUFMANN, FORTRESS FRANCE: THE MAGINOT LINE AND
FRENCH DEFENSES IN WORLD WAR II 166 (2006); WILLIAM ALLCORN, THE MAGINOT LINE
1928–45, at 57 (2003).
7 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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subprime mortgage crisis like the one that nearly crashed global
capitalism in the fall of 2008; however, it will not foreclose a
future debt crisis that could well eclipse the financial crisis of
2007-2009 in terms of severity and macroeconomic pain.8 The
Dodd-Frank Act does nothing to address the underlying structure
of globalization that creates incentives for excessive debt and
impairs employment in the United States and throughout the
developed world. This renders future debt crises inevitable.
Banks have every incentive to enhance their profits (especially
short-term profits that may support higher CEO compensation)
while being exposed to excessive risks of the financial crisis.9
Most importantly, the largest American banks continue to benefit
from government subsidies under the too-big-to-fail legal
construct that permits banks to privatize gains and socialize
losses.10 Banks can continue to manipulate risks and profits
through the use of derivatives and securities trading for many
years to come.11 Thus, while Dodd-Frank may prevent another
subprime crisis, it will prove unable to prevent a future, more
serious debt crisis.12 Indeed, it may render such a crisis more
likely by transforming implicit guarantees for megabanks into
explicit guarantees.13

8 According to Noble laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz in an interview by Kerry
O’Brien on ABC Australia:
It can and it almost surely will happen again, because we didn’t
deal with the problem of too-big-to-fail banks. It is one of the
reasons why it will happen again. And we didn’t really deal
effectively with all the kinds of excessive risk-taking, all the
problems of lack of transparency that were at the core of this crisis.
And so, yes, we understand what the issues are, we understand the
issues better than we did three years ago, but politics intruded the
power of the banks, was too great. They’re making $20 billion off of
derivatives. So rather than lending, they’re engaged in all of these
kinds of gambling and excessive risk-taking and generating large
profits, but it’s not helping the American economy and it’s putting
at risk American taxpayers.
The 7.30 Report: Troubles Ahead for World Economy, ABC (Austl.) (July 27, 2010),
http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2010/s2965891.htm.
9 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Obama’s Ersatz Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at A31.
10 Simon Johnson, Banking’s ‘Toxic Cocktail’ Is Too Big to Forget: Simon Johnson,
BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Jan. 26, 2011, 9:03 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/201101-26/banking-s-toxic-cocktail-is-too-big-to-forget-simon-johnson.html (opining that “the
situation still is dire”).
11 Louise Story, A Secretive Banking Elite Rules Trading in Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2010, at A1.
12 NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS: A CRASH COURSE IN THE
FUTURE OF FINANCE 239 (2010) (raising the prospect of sovereign debt defaults among the
“risky rich” and concluding that such a crisis “may well take place in a disruptive,
disorderly fashion” and, if so, “won’t be pretty”).
13 John B. Taylor, The Dodd-Frank Financial Fiasco, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2010, at
A19 (“Effectively the bill institutionalizes the harmful bailout process by giving the
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Part I of this article will explore the broad outlines (details
will remain elusive) of such a future crisis in order to reveal the
challenges facing legal reform. Part II will compare the risks
highlighted in Part I with the key elements of Dodd-Frank as
well as the gaps left unaddressed in Dodd-Frank. The article
concludes that the Dodd-Frank Act will not help avert the next
crisis and may well facilitate or exacerbate the next crisis. Much
like the Maginot Line, Dodd-Frank encourages complacency,
represents a massive diversion of resources and encourages bank
managers to strategically flank its proscriptions. Dodd-Frank,
unfortunately, limits itself to the last crisis, not to the next crisis.
I. THE CONTINUING PROBLEM OF EXCESSIVE DEBT
Debt continues to plague the global economy. In the United
States, for example, while the rate of debt accumulation slowed
during the crisis, it now seems poised to reaccelerate to levels
that are even higher than those at the outset of the crisis.14 The
United States’ current account deficit is increasing again,
meaning that the nation continues to borrow hundreds of billions
of dollars per annum from abroad.15 The U.S. economy remains
the consumer of last resort for the global economy, thereby
fueling growth throughout the developing world. Since dollars
earned from selling to the United States exceed those spent on
buying from the same, the excess is plowed into U.S. debt
instruments.16 This constant demand for the purchase of U.S.
debt instruments induces excessive debt in the United States by
lowering interest rates on dollar denominated debt.17 This debt
funds higher consumption in the United States and the only
question remaining today is when the next debt bubble will bust.
The former chief economist of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), Professor Simon Johnson, sees future debt problems
arising from the recent extension of the Bush-era tax cuts.
Specifically, Johnson argues that the recent bi-partisan
agreement to extend the so-called Bush tax cuts “moved us closer
government more discretionary power to intervene . . . . The problem of ‘too big to fail’
remains, and any cozy relationship between certain large financial institutions and the
government that existed before the crisis will continue.”).
14 U.S. Current Account Gap Widens, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Dec. 17, 2010, at A2.
15 Peter Morici, Morici: Japan Sound, U.S. Insolvent, FOXBUSINESS.COM (Jan. 27,
2011),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2011/01/27/peter-morici-japan-soundinsolvent/.
16 Don Lee, Mountain of Economic Trouble Ahead?, CHI. TRIB., June 20, 2010, at 3,
available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-06-20/business/ct-biz-0620-globaleconomy-20100620_1_consumer-debt-global-economy-american-consumer.
17 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Thanks to the Deficit, the Buck Stops Here, WASH. POST, Aug.
30, 2009, at B3.

Do Not Delete

112

12/7/2011 2:18 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 15:1

to a fiscal crisis, just as the euro zone now is experiencing.”18 The
extension of those tax cuts will add $400 billion to the U.S.
government’s fiscal deficit in 2011, creating the second largest
deficit since World War II.19 The IMF found that the tax cuts
would have little stimulative effect given their cost.20 On
January 28, 2011, Moody’s threatened to downgrade the credit
rating of the United States as early as 2013.21 Usually, an
economic crisis leads to chronic fiscal deficits for governments
because an economic contraction means diminished tax
revenues.22 In the United States, the decision to cut taxes, even
for the wealthiest, means deeper deficits with minimal
countervailing economic benefit.23
The United States also faces problematic state and local
debts.
Like the federal government, state and local tax
collections plunged during the financial crash and still hover
below the pre-crisis level.24 Expenditures increased in the face of
more economic suffering and needs arising from increased
unemployment and poverty.25 Meredith Whitney, a bank analyst
renowned for her prescient prediction of the financial collapse,
projects a major crisis in the state and municipal bond markets.26
Whitney recently claimed that up to one hundred municipal bond
issuers may default, leading to hundreds of billions in losses.27
She terms this problem “the single most important issue in the
US, and certainly the largest threat to the US economy.”28 Credit
rating agencies now warn that downgrades and increasing yields

18 Simon Johnson, Tax Cutters Set Up Tomorrow’s Fiscal Crisis: Simon Johnson,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 22, 2010, 6:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-1223/tax-cutters-set-up-tomorrow-s-fiscal-crisis-commentary-by-simon-johnson.html.
19 Damian Paletta et al., Deficit Outlook Darkens: Stark Warning for 2011 Fuels
Battle Over Government Spending and Taxation, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2011, at A1.
20 Michael
R. Crittenden, IMF Urges U.S. to Take Fiscal Steps to
Cut
Deficit,
WSJ.COM
(Jan.
27,
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704268104576108123476047128.html.
21 Jed Graham, U.S. Debt Shock May Hit in 2018, Maybe As Soon As 2013,
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, May 6, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.investors.com/
NewsAndAnalysis/Article.aspx?id=532490.
22 Sharing the Pain: Dealing with Fiscal Deficit, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2010,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/15604130.
23 Paul Krugman, Let’s Not Make a Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2010, at A25.
24 Ezra Klein, How Much Can We Blame on State Pensions?, WASH. POST (Oct. 12,
2010), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/10/brooks_draft.html.
25 Id.
26 Nicole Bullock, Spotlight Falls on US Cities’ Fundraising, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 26,
2011, at 4.
27 Id.
28 Id.

Do Not Delete

2011]

12/7/2011 2:18 PM

Dodd-Frank as Maginot Line

113

in the state and local bond markets will exacerbate funding
challenges state and local governments are facing.29
Similarly, student loans will inexorably create more bank
losses because of the dearth of job opportunities for graduates.
Recently, student loan debt burgeoned past one trillion dollars
and now exceeds credit card debt.30 Unemployment among
recent graduates soared in the wake of the financial crisis as
salaries fell, with no significant recovery in sight.31 Many
student loans carry punitive, even predatory features.32 With
student debt at a record high, a wave of defaults appears
inevitable and already reached an eleven-year high in 2008.33
The exposure of the financial sector to student loan losses is
unclear at best.34 While many of these loans are guaranteed by
the federal government, these losses do not disappear.35 Rather,
they exacerbate the risk of a sovereign debt crisis afflicting the
federal government, as discussed above.
Many private student loans are held by the financial system
which may well absorb further massive losses to bank capital.
For example, according to economist Nouriel Roubini, who
famously predicted the financial collapse in the fall of 2008, “one
of the most important risks” facing the global economy is the
“likely” spread of the Eurozone debt crisis to Portugal, Spain, and
Belgium.36 Moreover, the IMF and the stronger nations of
Europe seemingly lack the resources to contain this crisis.37 In
affected nations, the economic crisis holds profound political
implications and appears likely to topple governments.38
29 Jeanette Neumann, Global Finance: Warning From S&P on Munis, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 24, 2011, at C3.
30 Scott Cohn, Student Loans Leave Crushing Debt Burden, MSNBC.COM (Dec. 21,
2010, 7:39 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40772705/ns/business-cnbc_tv/.
31 Steven Greenhouse, ‘Glimmers of Hope’ for Grads, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2010, at
B1.
32 Mary Pilon, The $555,000 Student-Loan Burden, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703389004575033063806327030.html.
33 Hibah Yousuf, Student Loan Default Rate Creeps Higher, CNNMONEY.COM
(Sept.
13,
2010,
11:47
AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/09/13/pf/college/
student_loan_default_rate/index.htm.
34 Eric Dash, Citigroup to Sell Unit that Lends to Students, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2010, at B3.
35 Student
Loan
Debt
Slaves,
LIBERTY
INSIGHT
(Jan.
13,
2011),
http://libertyinsight.com/2011/01/13/student-loan-debt-slaves/.
36 Michael Heath, Roubini Sees Spread of Europe Debt Crisis Among Key 2011 Risks,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 17, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-17/roubini-seesspread-of-europe-debt-crisis-among-key-2011-risks.html.
37 Nouriel Roubini, Global Risk and Reward in 2011, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Jan. 13,
2011), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/roubini34/English.
38 Gavin Hewitt, The Eurozone Crisis and the Voters, BBC NEWS BLOG
(Jan. 25, 2011, 1:05 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/gavinhewitt/2011/01/
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Currently, the Eurozone holds out hope that restructuring debts
can resolve the crisis.39 Such restructuring, however, is likely to
trigger loss realization among Eurozone banks and lead to
another source of stress on bank capital. European banks have a
total exposure of twice their capital to sovereign debt of so-called
peripheral European Union nations.40 Thus, restructuring may
well simply replace one debt crisis with another.
These sovereign credit issues may trigger massive losses
throughout the global financial system. Because the government
allowed the previous system of financial non-regulation and misregulation to fester unabated until the passage of the DoddFrank Act on July 21, 2010, bank exposure to these sources of
financial losses are largely governed by the pre-Dodd-Frank
regime.41 Most importantly, it is impossible to surmise which
banks have what exposure to losses arising from these sources of
financial losses. Banks are largely able to gamble with this risk
through the derivatives markets on a completely unregulated
basis.42 When losses from these sources are realized, bank
capital could be compromised. This is particularly so, given that
banks still face massive losses of unknown magnitude from
before the period of 2007–2009.43
For example, bank capital remains under siege from the
massive foreclosure crisis arising from the “utter carelessness” of
the banks during the real estate boom.44 Essentially, banks not
only engaged in reckless underwriting of high-risk residential
real estate loans, they also failed to document mortgages and
repayment rights appropriately (destabilizing middle class
the_eurozone_crisis_and_the_vo.html.
39 Europe Bends Over to Help Greece Rip Up Debts, ASSOCIATED FOREIGN PRESS
(Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jXmo2b42waHrZKyfjOIPOiyQT_w?docId=CNG.6b94de75d88998f6d0176a48ce43503c.191.
40 John Paul Rathbone, Eurozone Can Learn Grim Latin Lessons, FIN. TIMES
(Dec.
21,
2010,
11:20 PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ac9b6954-0d33-11e0-82ff00144feabdc0.html#axzz1CgfvDT9H.
41 The Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010.
See Bill Summary & Status, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d111:HR04173:@@@R (last visited Mar. 22, 2011). Therefore, the banking
industry was governed by pre-Dodd-Frank regime prior to July 21, 2010.
42 David Min & Pat Garafalo, Regulating Derivatives Traffic: Establishing Speed
Limits and Traffic Lights to Improve Derivatives Safety, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 19,
2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/derivatives_traffic.html.
43 Martin Jacques, The New Depression, NEW STATESMAN (Feb. 12, 2009), available
at http://www.newstatesman.com/economy/2009/02/financial-crisis-china-banks.
44 U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 55 (Mass. 2011) (Cordy, J.,
concurring) (“[W]hat is surprising about these cases is not the statement of principles
articulated by the court regarding title law and the law of foreclosure in Massachusetts,
but rather the utter carelessness with which the plaintiff banks documented the titles to
their assets.”).
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property rights along the way).45 The entire industry used
fictitious mortgagees on recorded mortgage documents to evade
state and local recording fees.46 Banks seem to have lost (or at
least failed to negotiate to purchasers) huge numbers of
negotiable instruments such that many mortgage debts suffer
impaired enforcement.47
According to bank analyst Chris
Whalen, the banks will suffer debilitating losses as a result of
this recklessness for years to come akin to a kind of “cancer” on
their financial health.48 This cancer will impair bank earnings
and balance sheets for years to come. This will compound losses
flowing into the financial sector from the continued meltdown of
residential real estate into 2011.49 Banks still hold exposure to
trillions of dollars in residential real estate loans, most of which
now suffer from impaired valuation.50
As the residential real estate market continues to melt down,
banks face numerous other challenges. The commercial real
estate market may inflict billions more in losses on the financial
sector. Despite bank efforts to “extend and pretend” that
commercial loans are not troubled, a record high amount of
commercial loans are in default.51 Nearly one trillion dollars of
consumer debt suffers from serious delinquency.52 Low interest
rates impair net interest income as margins shrink.53 Thus,

45 Barry Ritholz, Foreclosure Fraud Reveals Structural & Legal Crisis, ROUBINI
GLOBAL ECONOMICS (Oct. 10, 2010, 12:48 PM), http://www.roubini.com/usmonitor/259737/foreclosure_fraud_reveals_structural___legal_crisis.
46 See generally Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending,
and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359 (2010)
(analyzing MERS, a nominee mortgage holder which was created by banking industry to
evade recording fees, and how it conflicts with laws and policy).
47 Gretchen Morgenson & Andrew Martin, Battle Lines Forming in Clash Over
Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, at A1.
48 Interview by Bloomberg with Christopher Whalen, Managing Director, Inst. Risk
Analytics (Oct. 18, 2010), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/video/63795070/.
49 Alejandro Lazo, Home Prices Decline in November, L.A. TIMES BLOG (Jan. 25,
2011, 6:28 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2011/01/home-prices-declinedin-november.html.
50 Steven A. Ramirez, Are the Megabanks Insolvent?, CORPORATE JUSTICE BLOG,
(Nov. 23, 2010, 3:36 PM), http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/aremegabanks-insolvent.html.
51 Julie Satow, ‘Bad Boy’ Guarantees Snarl Billions in Real Estate Debt, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2011, at B9.
52 Christine Ricciardi, More Current Mortgages Go Delinquent in 3Q as Household
Debt Falls, HOUSINGWIRE, Nov. 8, 2010, available at http://www.housingwire.com/
2010/11/08/more-current-mortgages-go-delinquent-in-3q-as-household-debt-falls.
53 See Joe Rauch, Corrected: Wells and US Bancorp Profits Up but Margins
Squeezed, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/19/uslvabanks-earnings-idUSTRE70I5SJ20110119?pageNumber=2.

Do Not Delete

116

12/7/2011 2:18 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 15:1

experts evince serious concern that many banks, particularly the
most risky megabanks, flirt with insolvency.54
Further, economic growth appears unlikely to rescue the
banks. Consumer deleveraging will continue to suppress demand
for quite some time.55 While the government seemingly mustered
endless resources to save a handful of banks, government
programs to help the great mass of American citizens can only be
termed modest at best.56 Unemployment rivals the joblessness
during the Great Depression, with little relief expected.57
Government spending seems destined to contract as austerity
rhetoric takes hold.58 Finally, the banks themselves continue to
hoard capital in the form of excess reserves which now total one
trillion dollars.59 Economic pessimism and concerns regarding
financial markets caused non-financial firms to hoard nearly two
trillion dollars more.60 All of this suggests continued economic
sluggishness, more losses on outstanding debt, and therefore
more bank losses.
The United States faces a crisis. Its banking and financial
sector fails to lend, and lending plays a crucial role in growth.61
54 William K. Black & L. Randall Wray, Foreclose on the Foreclosure Fraudsters,
Part I: Put Bank of America in Receivership, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 22, 2010, 2:08 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-k-black/foreclose-on-the-foreclos_b_772434.html;
Simon Johnson, Time for Some New Stress Tests for Banks, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG
(Oct. 21, 2010, 5:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/time-for-somenew-stress-tests-for-banks/. See also CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER OVERSIGHT
REPORT: EXAMINING THE CONSEQUENCES OF MORTGAGE IRREGULARITIES FOR FINANCIAL
STABILITY
AND
FORECLOSURE
MITIGATION
3
(2010),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT61835/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT61835.pdf
(assessing foreclosure crisis and concluding that “[b]ank regulators should also conduct
new stress tests on Wall Street banks to measure their ability to deal with a potential
crisis”).
55 James Saft, Good-bye Credit Crunch, Hello Slog, REUTERS BLOG (Jan. 25, 2011,
9:04 AM), http://blogs.reuters.com/jim-saft/2011/01/25/good-bye-credit-crunch-hello-slog/.
56 Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the
Lackluster First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L.
REV. 727, 787–88 (2010).
57 Ann Saphir, Cleveland Fed: US Jobless Rate Likely to Stay High, REUTERS
(Jan.
31,
2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/31/usa-fed-unemploymentidINN3123119920110131.
58 See Martin Crutsinger, Builders Began Work on Fewer Projects in 2010,
KANSASCITY.COM (Feb. 1, 2011, 9:18 AM), http://www.kansascity.com/2011/02/01/
2624194/builders-began-work-on-fewer-projects.html (“Spending on government projects
fell in December 2.8 percent. State and local spending dropped 1.8 percent and spending
by the federal government plunged 11.6 percent to the lowest level since October 2004.”).
59 Silvio Contessi, Are Bank Reserves and Bank Lending Connected?, MONETARY
TRENDS (Feb. 2011), http://research.stlouisfed.com/publications/mt/20110201/cover.pdf.
60 Justin Lahart, Companies Cling to Cash: Coffers Swell to 51-Year High as
Cautious Firms Put Off Investing in Growth, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2010, at A1, available
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703766704576009501161973480.html.
61 This contraction of credit predictably arose from a financial sector facing capital
depletion even after a bailout as incumbent bank managers (who logically should have
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Its economy fails to generate jobs.62 Yet the economy faces a debt
burden on par with the level of debt on the eve of the subprime
crisis.63 The financial sector faces staggering losses from a
variety of sources. The entire global economy bears too much
debt.64 Another debt crisis appears inevitable. When this crisis
hits, creditors will flee for safety and credit costs for the entire
economy will soar as they did in 2008. At that point, markets
will need to reckon with the fiscal position of the U.S.
government. The key issue will be whether the U.S. government
will rescue the megabanks again. Dodd-Frank suggests that the
government will do precisely that, as shown below.65 Then, the
riskiness of the megabanks will once again privatize gains and
socialize losses, which would culminate into a crisis that could
make the subprime crisis seem like an appetizer to a far more
grand main course.
II. THE FAILURES OF DODD-FRANK
The Dodd-Frank Act creates a toxic mix of affirmatively
dangerous statutory law, while at the same time failing to
address key structural causes of the financial crisis. The
continued presence of toxic debt, for example, is a direct function
of a flawed model of globalization that Dodd-Frank (indeed, our
entire political leadership) left unaddressed. Under Dodd-Frank,
the perverse incentives created by too-big-to-fail and the primary
arenas for such incentives will continue to operate unimpeded for
at least years to come. Finally, Dodd-Frank leaves the same
inept bank managers in power at the apex of our economy and

been terminated in the wake of their reckless stewardship) sought to conceal the full
extent of losses and become very risk-averse in order to maintain their incumbency.
Steven A. Ramirez, Subprime Bailouts and the Predator State, 35 DAYTON L. REV. 81, 96–
101 (2009).
62 Jon Hilsenrath, Messy New Estimates Complicate Explanation for Unemployment
Rate
Drop,
WSJ.COM BLOG
(Feb.
4,
2011,
1:12 PM),
available
at
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/02/04/messy-new-estimates-complicate-explanationfor-unemployment-rate-drop/.
63 Annaly Capital Management, Charts of the Day: The New Z.1 is Out!, CREDIT
WRITEDOWNS (Sept. 21, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.creditwritedowns.com/2010/09/chartsof-the-day-the-new-z-1-is-out.html.
64 Daniel Fisher, The Global Debt Bomb, FORBES (Feb. 8, 2010, 12:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0208/debt-recession-worldwide-finances-global-debtbomb.html.
65 Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner recently admitted that in the event of
another credit crisis “we may have to do exceptional things again.” OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TEMPORARY ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY
REPORT TO CONGRESS 10 (Jan. 26, 2011) (“To the extent that those ‘exceptional things’
include taxpayer-supported bailouts, his acknowledgement serves as an important
reminder that TARP’s price tag goes far beyond dollars and cents, and that the ultimate
cost of TARP will remain unknown until the next financial crisis occurs.”).
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financial system despite proof positive of their willingness to
inflict massive and reckless risks upon our system in exchange
for short-term gains and concomitant compensation payments.66
A. Fundamentally Flawed Globalization
The global economy relies upon the U.S. dollar as its reserve
currency, and this central flaw means excessive accumulation of
debt in the United States and the developed world generally.67
As issuer of the reserve currency, the United States must act as
borrower of last resort and consumer of last resort for the global
economy.68 The problem is that it cannot sustainably fulfill this
role any longer and the dollar reserve system is now breaking
down in a sea of debt that will trigger serial crises.69 Over two
years after the greatest debt crisis in our history, the global
economy is still rigged to create excessive debt within the United
States.70 Further, the dollar reserve system weakens demand
within the global economy which contributes to the loss of jobs in
the United States.71 Dodd-Frank fails to address this dynamic in
any way whatsoever and therefore can only be termed a failure of
political will.72 This failure of political will, in turn, represents
the powerful interests that continue to benefit from this flawed
66 Raghuram Rajan, Banker’s Pay Is Deeply Flawed, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2008),
http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto010920081142101282
(noting
the
incentives for CEOs and financial managers to tolerate excessive risks that increase
short-term returns in order to receive immediate compensation).
67 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 245–68 (2006) [hereinafter
STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK].
68 Id. at 265.
69 Id. at 254–56.
70 Aaron Task, Cruel Irony: Dollar’s Reserve Status Enables U.S. Debt Addiction,
YAHOO! FINANCE (Feb. 3, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/tech-ticker/cruel-ironydollar%27s-reserve-status-enables-u.s.-debt-addiction-535886.html.
See also Joseph
Stiglitz, Towards a New Global Reserve System, in ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, THE
FUTURE GLOBAL RESERVE SYSTEM—AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 1, 2 (Jeffrey D. Sachs et al.
eds., 2010), available at http://aric.adb.org/grs/papers/Future_Global_Reserve_System.pdf
(showing that “the dollar reserve system contributed to global financial instability and a
weak global economy” because “the reserve currency country got increasingly in debt as
others held more of its IOUs as part of their reserves” and “the build-up of reserves by
surplus countries led to weaknesses in global aggregate demand”).
71 See Stiglitz, Towards a New Global Reserve System, supra note 70, at 2.
72 According to Fed Chair Ben Bernanke:
One way or the other, fiscal adjustments sufficient to stabilize the federal
budget must occur at some point. The question is whether these adjustments
will take place through a careful and deliberative process that weighs priorities
and gives people adequate time to adjust to changes in government programs
or tax policies, or whether the needed fiscal adjustments will be a rapid and
painful response to a looming or actual fiscal crisis.
Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech before the National Press Club: The
Economic Outlook and Macroeconomic Policy (Feb. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110203a.htm.
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model of globalization—CEOs of transnational corporations,
particularly in the United States.73
Dodd-Frank fails to address the problems arising from this
deeply flawed model of globalization. Indeed, although the Act
mandates at least sixty-seven studies from various agencies, it
does not require any study of the impact of globalization or the
dollar reserve system.74 This is despite the fact that many
prominent economists and other commentators proposed sensible
solutions to the problem both before and after the crisis. For
example, Joseph Stiglitz recently highlighted a “remarkably
simple solution” (first proposed by John Maynard Keynes) to the
problem of reserves: allow the IMF to issue Special Drawing
Rights (SDRs) to act as a reserve currency so that no single
nation would bear the burden of the concomitant debt.75 I
recently expanded upon this proposal and argued that this new
issuer of a new reserve currency could act as a bank, and
leverage these currency reserves through fractional banking to
fund low-cost loans for high pay-off development initiatives that
could vindicate economic human rights.76 This would divert
reserves from funding excessive debt in the United States to
funding sustainable global growth.
B. Too-Big-to-Fail Endures
If credit markets perceive that a bank will not be allowed to
fail due to government intervention or guarantees, then creditors
will supply more credit at a lower cost. Further, managers will
tolerate excessive risk because they anticipate that gains are
privatized while losses are socialized through government
backing.77
Since the enactment of Dodd-Frank, there is
73 Steven A. Ramirez, American Corporate Governance and Globalization, 18
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 47, 63 (2007).
74 The SEC, CFTC, FDIC and Federal Reserve System each maintain websites
detailing the reports and studies they issue. See Reports and Studies, U.S. COMMODITY
FUTURES
TRADING
COMM’N,
http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/
ReportsandStudies/index.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2011); Implementing Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—Accomplishments, U.S. SEC. EXCH.
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/accomplishments.shtml (last visited
Mar. 16, 2011); FDIC and Financial Regulatory Reform, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2011); Regulatory Reform,
FED. RESERVE., http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform.htm (last visited Mar.
16, 2011); Christine Harper, Crash of 2015 Won’t Wait for Regulators to Rein in Wall
Street, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 8, 2010, 5:48 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-0809/crash-of-2015-won-t-wait-for-regulators-to-buckle-wall-street-safety-belts.html.
75 STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK, supra note 67, at 260.
76 Steven A. Ramirez, Taking Economic Rights Seriously after the Debt Crisis, 42
LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming 2011).
77 Ramirez, supra note 61, at 82.
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increasing skepticism that the Act will prevent future bailouts of
large financial firms in a manner different from the ad hoc
bailouts of late 2008.78 The statutory details of the Dodd-Frank
Act belie any claim that it ended bailouts for firms deemed toobig-to-fail.79
Section 1101 paves the way for the Fed to bail out large
banks, so long as it does so pursuant to a program or facility that
features “broad-based eligibility.”80 Indeed, the Act directs the
Fed and the Treasury to create emergency lending programs and
facilities “[a]s soon as practicable.”81 Similarly, section 1105 of
the Act directs the FDIC, in consultation with the Secretary of
Treasury, to create a “widely available program to guarantee
obligations of solvent insured depository institutions or solvent
depository institution holding companies (including any affiliates
thereof) during times of severe economic distress. . . .”82 As a
result, after Dodd-Frank, virtually every type of bailout pursued
by the Fed and the FDIC that occurred between 2007 and 2009
will now be more explicitly and more broadly available.83
Ironically, Dodd-Frank therefore mandates more “broad-based”
and “widely available” bailouts.84
Dodd-Frank also includes an “Orderly Liquidation
Authority” (OLA) for large, systemically significant firms that
appear poised to “default.”85 Such firms may be placed into FDIC
receivership, but only upon a vote of at least: (1) 2/3 of the
members of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, (2) 2/3 of
the members of the board of directors of the FDIC, and (3) a
written recommendation of the Treasury Secretary (made in
consultation with the President).86 As receiver, the FDIC holds
The Ruling Ad-Hocracy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2011, at A12.
Text of Obama Remarks on Dodd-Frank, MARKETWATCH (Jul 21, 2010, 11:43 AM),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/text-of-obama-remarks-on-dodd-frank-2010-07-21.
80Title XI Overview: 11.1 Emergency Lending Authority to Be Used Only to Provide
Broad-based Liquidity, AM. BANKERS ASS’N, http://www.aba.com/RegReform/RR11_1.htm
(last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
81 Dodd-Frank Act § 1101. Section 1101 amends section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve
Act, which operated as the primary mechanism of bailouts through the use of funds
supplied by the Federal Reserve System. Christian A. Johnson, Exigent and Unusual
Circumstances: The Federal Reserve and the U.S. Financial Crisis, 11 EUR. BUS.
ORG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1584731.
82 Dodd-Frank Act § 1105.
83 See Johnson, supra note 81 (“Under the Dodd-Frank Act amendment, it would
appear that the Federal Reserve would have been unable to lend directly to Bear Stearns
or AIG unless Bear Stearns or AIG would have otherwise qualified for the terms of a
facility or program in place ‘with broad-based eligibility.’”).
84 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1101, 1105.
85 Dodd-Frank Act § 203(b).
86 Id. Recently President Obama named William Daley, Midwest Chairman of JP
78
79
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total managerial power and succeeds by operation of law to all
powers of the stockholders, officers, and directors.87 The FDIC
thus controls all aspects of a firm’s business, including decisions
whether to liquidate or sell the company or parts of the
company.88 The FDIC may make loans to guarantee assets or
obligations or to purchase assets of any financial company put
into FDIC receivership under this authority.89 This further
expands bailout powers.90 The Act includes provisions designed
to conceal this form of bailout; however, in the end creditors do
not face a real prospect of loss in a crisis due to government
funding.91
If senior executives or directors of a firm are
“substantially responsible” for the failure of the firm, whether by
gross negligence or disregard of a duty of care, any compensation
they received within two years of receivership may be recouped
by the FDIC.92 This OLA process consequently could dissuade
mangers from excessive risk. Nevertheless, most firms will never
enter that process due to the multiple approvals necessary to
trigger the process and the political influence of the financial
sector.93
Dodd-Frank also gives regulators the power to break up
systemically risky firms.
Ultimately, keeping banks from

Morgan Chase & Co., as his new Chief of Staff. Becky Yerak, William Daley Becomes
White
House’s
Business
Connection,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Jan.
31,
2011),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-01-31/business/ct-biz-0131-daley-chase-20110131137_1_william-daley-jpmorgan-chase-business-connection (“‘It’s a big plus for the banking
industry,’ . . . banking analyst Richard Bove said of Daley’s move to the White House
earlier this month. ‘The fact that a banker is chief of staff is going to change the rhetoric
dramatically. With Daley there, JPMorgan will benefit, along with every other bank.’”).
87 Dodd-Frank Act § 210(a)(1)(A).
88 Dodd-Frank Act § 210(a)(1). Should the government ever muster the political will,
this provision paves the way to fragment the megabanks the next time they flirt with
insolvency. Unfortunately, the FDIC too often exercises its managerial powers to create
even larger banks. See David Mildenberg, Citigroup Agrees to Buy Wachovia’s Banking
Business,
BLOOMBERG
(Sept.
29,
2008),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aWwkv.J3bhY4.
89 Dodd-Frank Act § 204(d).
Under section 206, these actions must be for the
purpose of financial stability, not for the benefit of any particular company, and must be
approved by the Treasury under section 210(n)(9).
90 See Taylor, supra note 13 (“The FDIC does not have the capability to take over
large, complex financial institutions without causing disruption, so such firms and their
creditors are likely to be bailed out again.”).
91 Robert J. Shiller, Bailouts, Reframed as ‘Orderly Resolutions’, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
14, 2010, at BU5.
92 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 210(f), 203(c)(2)(s).
93 SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 6 (2010). According to Senate Majority Whip Dick
Durbin, the banking industry is the “most powerful lobby” and they “frankly own the
place.” Representative Collin C. Peterson, the former Chair of the House Agriculture
Committee, claims that they “run the place.” Ramirez, supra note 61, at 81.
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growing too large limits their economic and political influence.94
As a result, commentators greeted this part of the Act with some
degree of optimism.95
However, section 121 requires a
determination by the Fed that a firm poses a “grave threat” to
financial stability as well as the approval of 2/3 of the newly
created Financial Stability Oversight Board.96 No divestiture can
proceed without the Fed finding that other mitigatory actions are
“inadequate” for addressing threats to financial stability.97 Thus,
divestiture must be a last resort after all other options are
exhausted, and this presumably is subject to judicial review.
Notably, all of the too-big-to-fail banks that the government
rescued in 2008 are even larger today.98 Further, they remain
dangerously leveraged.99 As such, they all have proven to pose a
grave threat to financial stability, with little or no countervailing
economic benefit.100 Yet no action to mitigate that threat is

94 In fact, the FDIC routinely manages large banks in the context of traditional
failed bank receiverships without severe economic or financial consequences. The largest
such receivership to date is WaMu Savings Bank with $307 billion in assets, which
occurred at the height of the financial crisis with minimal impact. Robin Sidel et al.,
WaMu Is Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan, In Largest Failure in U.S. Banking History,
WALL ST. J., Sep. 26, 2008, at A1.
95 Simon Johnson, A Roosevelt Moment for America’s Megabanks?, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (July 14, 2010), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/johnson10/
English.
96 See Dodd-Frank Act § 121.
97 See id.
98 Thomas M. Hoenig, Op-Ed., Too Big to Succeed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at A37
(“[T]he five largest financial institutions are 20 percent larger than they were before the
crisis. They control $8.6 trillion in financial assets—the equivalent of nearly 60 percent of
gross domestic product. Like it or not, these firms remain too big to fail.”).
99 Anat R. Admati, Should Mega Banks Be Broken Apart?: Bankruptcy Is Not an
Option, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011, 4:05 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2010/12/07/should-megabanks-be-broken-apart/bankruptcy-is-not-an-option.
Numerous
studies demonstrate that banks should be required to hold much more capital than they
are currently required by law to hold or what they will be required to hold under the
Basel III international capital accords. See generally David Miles et al., Optimal Bank
Capital, Discussion Paper No. 31, BANK OF ENGLAND,
(Jan. 2011),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/externalmpcpapers/extmpcpaper0031.pdf;
Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital
Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Expensive 4 (Stan. Grad. Sch. of Bus., Research
Paper
No.
2065,
2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1669704. (“Setting equity requirements significantly higher than
the levels currently proposed would entail large social benefits and minimal, if any, social
costs.”). Thus, not only does the United States continue to suffer from too-big-to-fail
banks, but these banks are also significantly undercapitalized.
100 Simon Johnson, Should Megabanks Be Broken Apart?: We Haven’t Learned From
Ireland, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/12/07/
should-megabanks-be-broken-apart/we-havent-learned-from-ireland (“There are no
economies of scale or scope in banking over about $100 billion in assets. [There is not] a
single piece of evidence that society gains from having megabanks at today’s scale and
with today’s leverage.”).
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pending, much less any break-up. Break-ups consequently
appear remote.
Creditors have already concluded that Dodd-Frank preserves
the too-big-to-fail subsidies and therefore will fuel the continued
growth of such banks with cheaper capital. In fact, due to the
presence of government backing, the credit ratings agencies
specifically give the megabanks much higher credit ratings than
otherwise, notwithstanding Dodd-Frank.101 Thus, according to
Neil Barofsky, the Special Inspector General of the TARP
program: “These [too-big-to-fail] institutions and their leaders
are incentivized to engage in precisely the sort of behavior that
could trigger the next financial crisis, perpetuating a doomsday
cycle of booms, busts and bailouts.”102 As economist Simon
Johnson puts it: “If the big banks get large enough, we’ll become
like Ireland today—saving those institutions will ruin us fiscally,
destroy the dollar as a haven currency, and end financial life as
we know it.”103
Professor Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. also concludes that “DoddFrank does not solve the [too-big-to-fail] problem.” 104 He concurs
that too many avenues remain open for regulators to rescue
creditors of large banks, and that those regulators now have a
proven track record of indulging powerful banking interests, such
as managers of too-big-to-fail megabanks.105 Finally, Professor
Wilmarth echoes economists such as Joseph Stiglitz: “There is an
obvious solution to the too-big-to-fail banks: break them up. If
they are too big to fail, they are too big to exist.”106 Thus,
Congress ignored the thinking of leading academics and
economists and instead preserved the economic and political
power of the most reckless bankers in U.S. history, despite their

101 Ronald D. Orol, ‘Too Big to Fail’ a Recipe for Disaster, Watchdog Says, MARKET
WATCH (Jan. 25, 2011, 6:47 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/too-big-to-fail-arecipe-for-disaster-watchdog-2011-01-26?reflink=MW_news_stmp.
102 Id.
103 Simon Johnson, ‘Citi Weekend’ Shows Too-Big-to-Fail Endures: Simon Johnson,
BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Jan. 17, 2011, 9:10 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/201101-17/-citi-weekend-shows-too-big-to-fail-endures-simon-johnson.html.
104 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response
to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 3 (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1719126.
105 Id.
106 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF
THE WORLD ECONOMY 165–66 (2010). See also SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, supra
note 93, at 221 (“The best defense against a massive financial crisis is a popular
consensus that too big to fail is too big to exist.”);; ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 12, at 226
(“[N]ot only are such firms too-big-to-fail;; they’re too big to exist, and too complex to
manage properly.”).
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central role in causing the crisis.107 To the extent politicians sold
Dodd-Frank as the end of taxpayer-funded bailouts for large
financial firms, it may well prove a monumental political
fraud.108
C. The Derivatives and Hedge Fund Casino is Open Too Late
Derivatives are complex financial contracts that derive their
value by reference to some other securities, commodities or debt
instruments.109 Hedge funds are private pools of capital that
may invest or speculate in the full range of financial products.110
Hedge funds and derivatives exposed banks to massive losses
that were not transparent to regulators, often because of the fact
that much of this activity occurred through unregulated
affiliates.111 A review of Dodd-Frank regarding derivatives and
securities prohibitions illustrates that banks may continue to
gamble with derivatives and other complex securities and hedge
fund “investment” for years to come.112
Under section 716, banks are generally prohibited from
using derivatives.113 But, there is an exception for “bona fide
hedging and traditional bank activities.”114 This exception
apparently would include eighty percent of the derivatives
market.115 The prohibition on derivatives in this section does not
even take effect until July 21, 2012.116 Further, the prohibition
regarding bank derivative activities may be extended until
July 21, 2014, or possibly as late as July 21, 2015.117 Finally,
banks may continue to trade derivatives through affiliates in
accordance with Federal Reserve strictures.118 Thus, all of the
derivative trading that fueled the crisis will continue for at least
107 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963,
1032–43 (2009).
108 Watchdog Disputes White House Claim that Wall Street Reform Will End Taxpayer
Bailouts, ABCNEWS (Jan. 27, 2011, 10:02 AM), http://blogs.abcnews.com/thenote/2011/01/
watchdog-disputes-white-house-claim-that-wall-street-reform-will-end-taxpayerbailouts.html.
109 Dodd-Frank Act § 716.
110 Id.
111 CCH, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: LAW,
EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS 30–31 (2010).
112 Id. at 28.
113 Dodd-Frank Act § 716.
114 Id.
115 Orrick, Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, FINANCIAL
MARKETS ALERT, July 21, 2010, at 3–4, available at http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/
2833.pdf.
116 Dodd-Frank Act § 716(h).
117 Dodd-Frank Act § 716(f).
118 Dodd-Frank Act § 716(c).
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four years, and most derivatives trading will be permissible for
banks thereafter. Moreover, during that hiatus, banks can be
counted on to use their considerable political influence to further
dilute the derivatives prohibitions.119
Section 723 mandates that derivatives transactions be
cleared, but regulators have one year for promulgating a process
by which determinations are made for which derivatives must be
cleared and which ones may remain over-the-counter.120
Specifically, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
and the Securities Exchange Commission must “review each
swap, or any group, category, type, or class of swaps to make a
determination as to whether the swap or group, category, type or
class of swaps should be required to be cleared.”121 The following
factors, among others, bear upon this determination: (1) liquidity
for given type of derivative, (2) pricing data, and (3) effect on
systemic risk. If no facility wishes to clear a type of derivative
then no clearing is necessary.122 Thus, highly customized
derivatives likely need not be cleared. Again, the exceptions
threaten to swallow the rule, and much depends upon regulatory
rule-making.123 Further, the clearinghouses themselves may now
be too-big-to-fail because if they were to fail the banks would be
exposed to huge losses.124 To the extent that the large banks that
control a huge portion of derivatives trading are the most
influential members of the new derivatives exchanges, the entire
effort to shift counterparty risk of default to the clearinghouses
could lead to even bigger bailouts.125 Rather than controlling risk
through clearing of derivatives, Dodd-Frank may give the large
banks even more power.
The Act’s approach to securities trading and bank hedge
fund activities similarly proves relatively toothless. Under
section 619, banks cannot engage in proprietary trading or invest
in hedge funds.126
The Fed, however, may permit bank
119 John Carney, Blanche Lincoln Is Gone. Will Dodd-Frank Derivatives Rules Be
Next?, CNBC (Nov. 4, 2010, 11:44 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/40007299/
Blanche_Lincoln_Is_Gone_Will_Dodd_Frank_Derivatives_Rules_be_Next.
120 Dodd-Frank Act § 723.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Aline Van Duyn, Derivatives Still in Flux as Dodd-Frank Deadline Looms, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011, 9:19 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6211d098-2b07-11e0-a65f00144feab49a.html#axzz1HJV8vyP3.
124 Gretchen Morgenson, Count on Sequels to TARP, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at
BU1.
125 Louise Story, A Secretive Banking Elite Rules Trading in Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2010, at A1.
126 Dodd-Frank Act § 619(a).
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investments in illiquid hedge funds or private equity funds until
2022.127 Liquid funds may be held until 2017.128 Indeed, nothing
changes at all until October of 2012, and no divestitures are
required until October of 2014, at the earliest.129 While some
transition time may be warranted, a spin-off to shareholders or
public investors could certainly occur within a year.130 In any
event, bank capital will continue to be exposed to securities
trading and hedge funds for many years notwithstanding the socalled Volcker Rule.131
The second problem is the exceptions to the trading and
hedge fund ban under section 619.132 Hedging, underwriting and
market-making activities are permissible.133 Banks may still
continue to organize and offer hedge funds and private equity
funds. They may still devote up to three percent of their capital
to trading and hedge fund investments.134 The regulators may
further permit trading and investments that promote “the safety
and soundness of the banking entity . . . and the financial
stability of the United States.”135 These exceptions may well
operate to swallow the rule when it takes effect in coming years
and decades. Even the intellectual father of these rules—former
Fed Chair Paul Volcker—remains dissatisfied with the so-called
Volcker Rule.136
This approach toward securities and derivatives trading
exacerbates the fundamental distortion toward risk.
The
exceptions to the prohibition of derivatives trading within banks
swallow the rule. The Act allows banks to trade securities and
invest in hedge funds into the next decade. Thus, the Act gives
large banks a subsidized cost of capital while largely preserving
their ability to gamble in the derivatives and securities markets.
CEOs and other senior bank managers therefore face the
identical incentives to gorge on risk that they faced before 2008
to ring up short profits without regard to future losses that may
127 Dodd-Frank Act § 619(c)(3)(B). See also Financial Regulation, SKADDEN (Jan. 10,
2011), http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=51&itemID=2328.
128 Dodd-Frank Act § 619(c).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Dodd-Frank Act § 619 (implying securities trading and liquid hedge funds are
allowed until October 2012).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Tom Braithwaite, Volcker Takes Aim at Long Term Investments, FIN. TIMES (Jan.
20,
2011,
12:30 AM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a03c58c-242a-11e0-a89a00144feab49a.html.
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come to fruition only after the payment of incentive-based
compensation.
Even if a firm approaches insolvency, the
payment of golden parachute arrangements further blunts the
disincentives senior managers face for excessively risky conduct.
D. CEOs as the New Potentates
Public corporations in the United States are burdened by
excessive CEO autonomy.137
As John Cassidy highlights,
economists and others have reached a “rare consensus” that
managerial pay played a central role in the financial crisis.138
The essential problem revolves around the manipulation of risk
to achieve artificially high profits today, at the expense of longterm solvency.139 Ultimately, Dodd-Frank fails to disrupt this
reality in the foreseeable future, despite including some positive
steps.
For example, section 951 gives shareholders a say on pay via
non-binding shareholder resolutions to approve executive
compensation including severance pay.140 Section 952 requires
all listed companies to have independent compensation
committees with the power to directly retain compensation
advisers, including independent legal counsel.141 Section 953
directs the SEC to issue rules requiring more expansive
disclosures to shareholders regarding executive compensation,
“including information that shows the relationship between
executive compensation actually paid and the financial
performance of the issuer, taking into account any change in the
value of the shares of stock and dividends of the issuer and any
distributions.”142 Section 954 mandates the SEC to promulgate
rules requiring national securities exchanges and associations to
prohibit the listing of issuers that do not comply with their own
compensation recovery policies.143 In these policies, issuers must
set forth requirements on recovery of executive compensation in
137 Steven A. Ramirez, Lessons from the Subprime Debacle: Stress Testing CEO
Autonomy, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter Ramirez, Lessons from the
Subprime Debacle].
138 John Cassidy, Wall Street Pay: Where is the Reform?, NEW YORKER (July 23,
2010), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2010/07/wall-street-pay.html
(“Despite widespread anger on the part of the public, and a rare consensus among
economists that faulty compensation structures were partly responsible for the financial
crisis, the U.S. political system has failed to rise to the challenge.”).
139 Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Banks Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2007, at A37,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/23/opinion/23krugman.html.
140 Dodd-Frank Act § 951.
141 Dodd-Frank Act § 952.
142 Dodd-Frank Act § 953.
143 Dodd-Frank Act § 954(a).

Do Not Delete

128

12/7/2011 2:18 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 15:1

the event there was a material noncompliance that led to an
accounting restatement.144 Further, under these policies, the
issuers must be able to recover up to three years worth of
executive compensation from the date of an accounting
restatement.145 Due to the perception that financial CEOs
manipulated risk to enhance their compensation, Congress
directed the Fed to issue rules creating independent risk
management committees at large bank holding companies.146
Each of these laudatory initiatives mitigates the control of the
CEO and senior management over the public firm, yet even
taken together, they will not alter the autonomy of CEOs over
the proxy machinery and the board of directors.
Other sections do, in fact, address this core source of CEO
power. Section 957 now requires rules of exchanges to prohibit
broker votes without shareholder direction in all “significant
matter[s],” including executive compensation and election of
members of the board of directors.147 This is a significant step
toward real corporate democracy. Uninstructed broker votes
distort election results, thereby benefiting managers because
they “almost always are cast in favor of management’s proposals
and candidates for board seats,” according to the Council of
Institutional Investors.148 This new rule ensures that biases in
favor of management are removed in contested elections or proxy
contests.
Section 971 could operate to create more contested elections,
as it explicitly gives the SEC the power to permit shareholders to
use companies’ proxy solicitation materials to nominate
directors.149
The struggle for shareholder access to
management’s proxy for the purpose of director elections lingered
for decades prior to Dodd-Frank.150 The SEC’s exercise of this
power could hardly warrant the term radical; the SEC rule
Dodd-Frank Act § 954(b).
Id.
Dodd-Frank Act § 165.
Dodd-Frank Act § 957.
Broker Voting, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, http://www.cii.org/
resourcesKeyGovernanceIssuesBrokerVoting (last visited Mar. 22, 2011). See also
Proposal to Eliminate Broker Discretionary Voting for the Election of Directors, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/resource%20center/correspondence/2009/CII%20Broker%
20Voting%20Comment%20Letter%20(File%20Number%20SR-NYSE-2006-92).pdf
(advocating strongly for the elimination of uninstructed broker voting and detailing the
partial results of this type of voting).
149 Dodd-Frank Act § 971.
150 Laurenz Vuchetich, The Rise and Fall of the Proxy Access Idea: A Narrative, 1
HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 18, 18 (2010), available at http://www.hblr.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/11/Laurenz-Rise-and-Fall-of-Proxy-Access.pdf.
144
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146
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148
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allows shareholders with three percent ownership or more that
have held such ownership for at least three years to nominate
directors to stand for election through management’s proxy
statement.151 Nevertheless, the SEC unexpectedly stayed the
effectiveness of its own rule in response to lobbying efforts from
business interests.152 Therefore, at least until 2012, this rule
remains mired in litigation.153 In the meantime, as I have argued
elsewhere, the current managers hold too much sway over board
members, who in turn are subject to insufficient accountability
under law.154
In all, these changes hold the potential for a real revolution
in corporate governance. Yet, that revolutionary change will
take years to take root. The power of the CEO in the public firm
has receded in the past ten years with respect to key elements of
the public firm such as the audit committee and the nominating
committee.155 The Dodd-Frank Act constitutes another step in
the federal redesign of corporate governance to stem excessive
CEO autonomy. Nevertheless, it will take years for these
changes to take root in the boardroom. Even after the litigation
challenging shareholder proxy access ends, it will take many
years for boards to truly exercise independence from the CEO in
the face of long-standing institutional barriers to independent
monitoring.156 Simply put, deeper and more fundamental reform
of corporate governance is needed to take effect more rapidly.
The Act offers a package of reforms on this front that will likely
prove to be too little too late in order to fundamentally change
managerial incentives for at least the next decade.
E. Winning the Subprime War
Dodd-Frank effectively stems predatory lending and holds
the potential to reduce the prospect of exploitative debt
generally.
Under section 1403: “[N]o person shall pay to a mortgage
originator . . . compensation that varies based on the terms of the
loan (other than the amount of the principal).”157 Section 1404
151 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 179 (Sept. 16, 2010)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249).
152 Vuchetich, supra note 150, at 19.
153 Id.
154 Ramirez, Lessons from the Subprime Debacle, supra note 137, at 30–34.
155 Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory
Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 321, 343 (2007).
156 MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 186–88 (2005).
157 Dodd-Frank Act § 1403.
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creates broad private remedies for the violation of this
prohibition.158 This should end the steering of prime borrowers
into subprime loans.159 Section 1411 requires mortgage lenders
to make a good faith determination that a mortgage loan can be
repaid.160 Section 1413 permits the victim of a loan that does not
comply to raise a violation of section 1411 as a defense even
against subsequent assignees, and even after the expiration of
any statute of limitations.161 The amount of the defense includes
costs and attorney fees. This should end predatory loans.162
Section 917 requires a study regarding financial literacy.163
Section 1021 requires the new Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau to conduct financial education programs and to
promulgate regulations prohibiting abusive and predatory
loans.164
In aggregate, these provisions reflect Congressional
determination to stem abusive and predatory lending which lay
at the root of the subprime debacle. Consumer lending will not
likely form the center of a future credit crisis as a result of these
provisions.
Indeed, critics suggest the Dodd-Frank Act
essentially abolishes all but “plain vanilla” mortgages.165
CONCLUSION
Like the Maginot Line, the Dodd-Frank Act will prove useful
in winning the last war—the subprime crisis—but it will not
prevent future debt crises. The Dodd-Frank Act can only be

Dodd-Frank Act § 1404.
This created unnecessary defaults as more borrowers bore the burden of excessive
fees and costs. Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very CreditWorthy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2007, at A1 available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB119662974358911035.html?mod=hps_us_whats_news (reporting on study that
found up to sixty-one percent of subprime borrowers could qualify for prime loans).
160 Dodd-Frank Act § 1411.
161 Dodd-Frank Act § 1413. The fact that the defense can be raised against assignees
means that it will now be difficult to securitize predatory loans.
162 Predatory loans sparked the crisis. Indeed, the nation’s largest mortgage lender,
Countrywide Financial, also settled the largest predatory lending case. Ramirez, Lessons
from the Subprime Debacle, supra note 137, at 24–25.
163 Dodd-Frank Act § 917.
164 Dodd-Frank Act § 1021. It appears that an early effort of the new Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau will be to standardize loan disclosure statements to permit
earlier comparison shopping by consumers. Carter Dougherty, Big Lenders May Lose with
Simpler Mortgage Disclosure, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Jan. 14, 2011, 2:44 PM)
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-01-14/big-lenders-may-lose-with-simplermortgage-disclosure.html.
165 Kristie D. Kully & Laurence E. Platt, Hope You Like Plain Vanilla!: Mortgage
Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Title XIV), FIN. SERVS. REFORM ALERT
(K&L/Gates), July 8, 2010, available at http://www.klgates.com/newsstand/
Detail.aspx?publication=6528 (last visited Mar. 11, 2011).
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termed an epic failure of policy. The Act includes some positive
elements such as the corporate governance reforms and
predatory finance prohibitions. Nevertheless, the importance of
these reforms pales in comparison to the risks of another
financial meltdown, as well as deeply impaired macroeconomic
performance far into the future.
The Act allows massive government guarantees of the
largest financial concerns to persist and even makes such
backstops explicitly available under law.166 This continues the
massive subsidies implicit in the too-big-to-fail problem, and
entails a proven means of assuring excessive risk in the financial
system. Indeed, the Act formalizes the power of the FDIC and
the Fed to bail out systemically critical financial institutions.167
The orderly liquidation process offers further bailout
mechanisms.
Dodd-Frank therefore continues regulatory
indulgence, even facilitation, of excessive risk in the financial
sector.
The Act also allows essentially unbridled derivatives and
securities trading for years into the future and beyond.168 Large
banks will in fact likely control any derivatives clearinghouse or
exchange which are likely themselves too-big-to-fail.169 Many
derivatives will not be cleared and banks will continue to trade
these instruments. Hedge fund investments also continue after
the Act.170 So, the very risky securities and trading activities
that culminated in the crisis of 2007–2009 may continue
unabated despite the presence of the massive subsidized capital
provided by the government.
The Act mitigates these negative elements through the
possibility of corporate governance reform. Yet, there is no
restoration of private liability and the government continues to
act parsimoniously to say the least in pursuing criminal actions
and civil enforcement through the SEC.
The remaining
provisions may well diminish CEO autonomy to saddle the firm
with excessive risk as a means of pumping up current profits, but
these provisions will not compensate for the basic profit
incentives in favor of recklessness and fraud within the
boardroom of the public firm. The best hope for changing this

166
167
168
169
170

Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1101, 1105.
Dodd-Frank Act § 203.
See Orrick, supra note 115.
See Morgenson, supra note 124.
See Financial Regulation, supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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outcome, shareholder nominees to the board, could take years to
hold sway.
The upshot of Dodd-Frank is that it continues and even
formalizes massive subsidies and incentives for risk within the
financial firm. Managers continue to have the means and the
motive to crash the global financial system. Our debt laden
economy will certainly provide the opportunity for financial
manipulation of risk. The global economy and the U.S. economy
remain mired in debt. With continuing financial losses for the
banking sector, the credit mechanism seems broken and bankers
continue to hoard massive cash. The basic structure of the global
economy will continue to generate more debt in the developed
world even as growth is impaired. Dodd-Frank seems oblivious
to all of this.
Capitalism in America appears destined to continue to
degenerate into a rigged game in favor of those controlling the
most amounts of wealth. Dodd-Frank may well entrench this
pernicious economic reality by allowing it to fester. By any
measure, it preserves the power and economic prospects of the
very financial elites whose misconduct caused the crisis in the
first instance. In my view, the estimated $591 million invested
in lobbying (since January of 2009)171 and the $112 million
invested in campaign contributions to the members of the
conference committee (since 1989)172 yielded precisely the returns
expected and demanded by our financial elite: the ability to play
in the high-risk securities and derivatives markets with
continued government backing without any prospect of being
broken up.
Dodd-Frank will prevent a crisis in subprime lending from
recurring. But, a future credit crisis, one that may well be
brewing presently, could deliver a shock to the financial system
similar to, if not worse than, that which triggered the crisis of
late 2008. Dodd-Frank will be useless against that crisis because
it essentially preserves the power of the financial elite that
caused the last crisis and preserves the incentives that gave rise
to that crisis. Dodd-Frank stands as a monument to a deeply
misguided, if not actually corrupt, political and economic elite.

171 Jennifer
Liberto, Lobbyists Swarm as Wall Street Bill Talks Start,
CNNMONEY.COM (June 10, 2010, 11:22 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/06/10/news/
economy/Wall_Street_Reform/index.htm.
172 Id.

